Spent @ MindSay

I hate middle class.  When you hear someone say, "The Rich get Richer and the Poor get Poorer" in the United States it is NO JOKE!

But there is one class of folks that the majority of the US Citizens fall into that the gov't, organizations, DHS systems, and the Rich forget about and that is the Middle Class Citizens.

Sure we have jobs that are decent paying.  Sure we are able to go to Wally World, JC Penny's, Grocery Stores and the such to get clothes, household items, and food.  But what about all the other lil things that are needed in our lives that we can't afford.  We are the ones that pay our bills, live in debt the majority of the time, and have the same bills as the Rich with less money.  The same bills as the Poor but get no assistance.  Our kids have to help pay their own college education anymore.  And by gods, we aren't allowed to live one freaking month with out worrying where our next meal is coming from vs if we are going to pay that dayum medical or electric bill becaue insurance in this country bites for the middle class!

Say oh houses?  The Rich can go buy a house.  The Poor can apply for public assistance, hud, and habitat for humanity.  The Middle Class.........your fucked.  You make to much money to get assistance and your to dayum poor with avarage to crappy credit to get a loan.

What about that sport your child wants to play?  The Rich can pay the fee, buy the sports equipment and hire the nanny to go watch along with them.  The Poor can get the fee waived, apply for equipment grants and or organizations donate it to the families.  The Middle class.......your fucked.  You do some money juggling to figure out how to pay the fee, you make your kid go a week or so with no equipment and make them borrow their siblings, their cousin's, their best friends or hope the coach has extra until you can juggle that money again to buy that equipment.

How about utlities?  The Rich can write out that heavty winter electric and gas bill for heating.  The Poor can apply for public assistance, get grants from the DHS and other organizations, and apply for reduced heating budgets.  The Middle Class.........we are fucked yet again.  We make to much for reduced heating budgets, public assitatnce and grants.  And yay we have to pay our kids' school breakfast and lunch bills because we make to much to get free or reduced breakfast and lunches, so we start juggling that money again.

Many people wonder why so many folks of all races and cultures are cynical and judgemental of each other.  I'll tell you why.  The gov't loves to say oh you white folks aren't getting any help because your middle class and the poor black/hispanic/asian folks need more help.  Then they turn around and tell the black folks.....Well you all aren't getting any help because your middle class and  because we have to help out the hispanic/asian/and all those poor white folks living down on two streets over......you know the ones driving the cadallic!  Next they turn around and tell the hispanic folks.......well you all have our jobs now so you don't need any help because your officially middle class now.  We have to give it to the asians/blacks/whites who are worse off then you all.  And finally the asians get told you too are also middle class, own your own business, eat our pets and paid for your family to move over here.

SEE!!!  We are all judgemental and hypicritical because the gov't loves us to be that way.  They want to keep us Middle Class folks, the ones with educations and common sense from liking and associating with each other because if we all got together and realzied hey we may look different but have the same problems and it's the gov'ts fault for making us live pay check to pay check we might do something about it!

Okay I think I am done.  Can you tell we get our paycheck today?  Can you tell that it is already spent on bills and that like most US Citizens we do the money juggle to feed our kids and pay bills?

March, 2006

 Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., it was widely reported that al-Qaeda had given serious consideration to crashing commercial aircraft into several nuclear plants on that day.

According to journalist Jeffrey St. Clair, in his September 14, 2002 Counterpunch article (The Fire Next Time), al-Qaeda operatives Ramzi bin al-Shaibah and Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammad told Al-Jazeera interviewer Yosri Fouda, that future attacks on western nuclear facilities could not be ruled out.

 While it is true that nuclear reactors are housed in buildings that are among the most durable modern structures in existence, and have been designed to (hopefully) withstand the force of earthquakes, no one had ever conceived of a direct impact from a large commercial aircraft full of aviation fuel or from some other similar massive explosive assault.

 Some authorities state that the consequences would be truly catastrophic.

But the real Achilles heels at nuclear plants are the adjacent spent fuel facilities, which contain major concentrations of highly radioactive material. They lack the heavy duty containment safeguard provided for the reactor, and could be considered "sitting ducks" for disastrous terror attacks.

Large explosions, along with major fire resulting in radioactive release from spent fuel would have serious health, social and economic consequences for people in the surrounding geographical area. It should be noted that many of our nuclear facilities are in close proximity to the Great Lakes. Any ecological disaster resulting from terrorism could affect both Canada and the United States.

Unfortunately, none of the discussion papers commissioned by the Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) deals forthrightly and directly with the need to "harden" existing spent fuel facilities at reactor-sites to better protect them from such an attack. Some of the discussion papers deal with nuclear waste security, but in rather general and overly reassuring terms. These discussion papers are available to the public from the NWMO. The references to pertinent discussion papers follow my commentary on the discussion documents dealing with the security of nuclear waste:

In my view, the NWMO discussion papers (with the exception of the final one by Ed Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists), do not truly come to grips with the growing threat of extremist Islamic terrorism in the world, and how spent nuclear fuel could be used to further that threat.

 Perhaps one reason for this is that Canada, unlike many other countries, has, thankfully, not yet been subjected to these barbaric attacks. Another possibility is that Canadian authorities are actually working on the problem, but prefer to keep their efforts quiet----for security reasons. In any event, none of these papers directly identify, in any degree of detail, possible kinds of terrorist scenarios and how Canada could develop plans to deal with them.

Mostly, the papers hide behind administrative requirements and regulations of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, almost as if somehow the rule book itself provides a wall of protection.

1 Transportation of spent nuclear fuel:

Several discussion papers emphasize that there have been no attacks on spent fuel shipments anywhere in the world. But, some also point out that there have been relatively few spent fuel shipments. If spent fuel is to be moved from reactor sites to any centralized locations, shipment frequency would increase dramatically over decades. It is hard to imagine that such a change would escape the notice of terrorists who are becoming increasingly sophisticated with their information networks and their technology for destructive acts.

Lauding past performance is not a comforting response to the potential threats of the future.

 Assertions to the effect that attacks upon spent fuel shipments would fail, or produce very limited negative consequences, or that safeguards in the present security system are adequate, minimize the fact of the rapid advance of destructive technologies now in use or potentially available to those who wish to do us harm.

And, as Mr. Bin Laden and his gang of religious fanatics have indicated, all of us who are not in his camp, can be considered "infidels" and fair game.

 Are contemporary spent fuel transportation casks on trucks or trains sufficiently "robust" to withstand a major, high yield type of attack?

 Many nuclear watchdog groups and others, point out that governments have not undertaken the kinds of full scale tests required, and therefore, the question cannot be reliably answered.

As one paper points out, other transported substances might be more easily used by terrorists. Perhaps, but that overlooks the essence of the terrorist mentality and objectives; i.e., to terrorize the public. The large scale psychological impact on the public from damage or destruction of a radioactive nuclear source (as contrasted with any other substance) should never be underestimated.

Any contemplated large-scale, long-time period movement of spent nuclear fuel from reactor sites to some centralized storage or repository site, is, for me, truly a "non-starter." Furthermore, I am fully confident that communities along nuclear waste transportation routes would veto any such plan.

2 Security of the storage options themselves:

 In spite of the reassuring words about security of the various options in some of the above cited discussion papers, no concrete evidence has been presented that any one of the nuclear waste management options is really secure from large scale terrorist attacks. The onus has been placed upon current regulatory standards which were produced for a bygone age. Nowhere (with the exception of Ed Lyman's paper) have some of the key technical issues surrounding terrorism even been identified. Nowhere in these papers has the central issue of the need for securing and "hardening" on-reactor-site storage facilities against contemporary terrorist methodology, been addressed.

As long as the reactors are operating, there will always be about a ten year (cooling off) inventory of high-level nuclear waste at the reactor sites, even if the older waste is moved somewhere else. The technical problems surrounding the security of that on-site waste must be addressed. That they have not been adequately addressed in the NWMO discussion papers dealing with the subject of security, is a very serious deficiency; one which would make any attempt at the selection of a final nuclear waste management option, a dubious exercise at best.

Outside of a general recognition of need, specific security problems and protections for the centralized (above or below ground) storage option were not mentioned. Both a centralized storage facility and an underground repository facility share some of the same security risks; i.e., transportation to them, as well as vulnerability of protracted surface exposure at the destination, including loading and unloading, repackaging, and movement to the final resting place.

Advocates of "permanent" underground burial in a deep geological repository have long insisted that their option is virtually completely secure; from theft, terrorism, accidents, etc. As indicated above, the permanent burial option is still subject to the security risks of transportation and the exposed surface destination. Nor does burial solve the problem of the "hot" waste that must remain at the reactor sites for a decade before being moved.

Can geological repositories really remain secure for thousands, or even hundreds of years? Some scientists think not and suggest that such facilities could become "plutonium mines" of the future. An underlying premise of the burial concept is that the waste would not only become irretrievable, but the waste repositories themselves, would require "no institutional controls."

Given the advance of science and technology, there is absolutely no reason to believe that a sealed-up underground facility would need any fewer institutional controls than an aboveground one. It would be prudent to assume that those in the future who might want to extract the contents of an underground nuclear burial place, will have the capabilities to do so with whatever technologies, and for whatever purposes they may then have.

 In any event, by now it should be crystal clear that this "out-of-sight-out-of-mind" approach was not embraced by a public which was confronted with the spectre of permanent geological burial. Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., (AECL) discovered this in the 1980's while trying to implement such a program in the Canadian Shield rock in Manitoba and Ontario.

More recently, media accounts of an NWMO commissioned study (Citizens' Dialogue on the Long-term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, July, 2004) reported that "Canadians want the radioactive waste from their nuclear reactors stored within reach, not dropped down holes deep into the rocky Precambrian Shield and forgotten. And they don't trust government, industry or existing regulators with the job."

 In the U.S., the Commission which studied the circumstances that led up to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, pointed to a "lack of imagination" on the part of the intelligence community. I note a singular lack of imagination in most of the Canadian NWMO discussion papers that deal with the subject of security and nuclear waste. There is an unmistakable aura of smugness and complacency in some of these writings which I find disquieting. They convey the message "Don't worry, we have it all under control." Anytime I hear that kind of message on a subject of this gravity--I do indeed worry. And so should we all! 

 Pertinent Discussion Papers :

One discussion paper, numbered 3-3, is under the category, Health and Safety, and entitled the Status of Canadian and International Efforts to Reduce the Security Risk of Nuclear Fuel Waste, (by Science Applications International Corporation).

It is an overview of current security requirements and applications to future management possibilities and includes basic information about how nuclear waste is currently generated and how it is managed in Canada and internationally. It assesses the nature and extent of potential threats against nuclear waste and provides a section on current security measures including a "risk management approach." It also summarizes Canadian and international security requirements, as well as application of existing security regulations in the context of storage, disposal, reprocessing and transportation. One of its main conclusions is that current storage management as well as future management options meet Canadian and International requirements; that there have been no "credible threats" to the fuel waste and that the present system acts as a deterrent to "...the current crop of potential terrorists."

Several other NWMO discussion papers deal with security of spent fuel transportation:

Number 6.8, under the Technical Methods category is called Review of the fundamental issues and key considerations related to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, by Gavin J. Carter of Butterfield Carter and Associates, L.L.C.

In its Section 8 (Security Requirements) this paper concludes that transportation of spent fuel "can be managed safely" and is a "low risk activity." It notes that illegal procurement or attacks on a shipment of spent fuel has never occurred anywhere in the world. International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA) in 1972 first published guidelines for physical protection, used by governments in member countries. Its most recent document is INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. (1980) which requires specific arrangements and meeting of defined standards of physical protection for movements of nuclear material. The paper notes the existing use of armed guards in certain transport situations e.g., plutonium, (or spent fuel through heavy populated areas in some countries). Some of its main conclusions are that hazardous material is not an appealing target for thieves as it is difficult to handle, and of little financial or practical value; that spent fuel casks are "... too unwieldy to move quickly", etc. ( difficult for someone to steal or to use for a "dirty bomb"). It notes that "...shipments of spent fuel take place relatively infrequently. As for a terrorist attack, the paper asserts that "A large explosive charge would be necessary to breach the containment of the cask. Even if this is achieved, a dangerous disbursement of radioactive materials will not necessarily occur." The section on security concludes with the statement that "... there are many substances being transported much more frequently every day that would be more attractive options for terrorists than spent fuel casks."

Discussion Paper Number 6-6, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Transportation Systems of High-level Radioactive Waste Management, by Wardrop Engineering, Inc.

 This paper reviews the status of plans for transport of used fuel in various countries and deals with possible methods of transportation to a centralized storage or underground repository facility in Canada. This paper observes that "...though large-scale shipments of used fuel are not currently conducted in Canada, it is a distinct possibility in the future." In its section 6.10, "Transportation Security Plans," it provides a general statement of Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) license and threat assessment requirements. It does identify some of the measures that might be required for security, such as armed guards, escort personnel, and response forces. In addition to security of transportation issues, several other papers review security aspects of some of the management options themselves.

Discussion Paper 6-1, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Reactor Site Storage Systems For Used Nuclear Fuel, by Senes Consultants Limited

Primarily, this paper reviews methods and plans for on-site nuclear waste storage throughout Canada. Some tangential issues are covered, including Security (in section 3.3).

As is the case with some of the other papers dealing with security issues, it mainly addresses the basic CNSC regulatory framework with a general description of the procedures that must be followed for the security of spent nuclear fuel. Although it does not address the need for further securing or "hardening" of on-site storage against high-impact terrorist threats, it does recognize public concern. It states that during NWMO workshops and discussion groups, in the wake of September 11, 2001, participant comments "...reflected concerns about the security of fuel currently stored at the reactor sites.

" Paper 6-3, under the Technical Methods category is titled Status of Geological repositories for Used Nuclear Fuel, by Charles McCombie, McCombie Consulting

This paper provides an overview and assessment of the international status and developments of the underground "disposal" (burial) option for the long-term management of nuclear waste. Much of the paper relates to the safety of this option. The issue of security as related to the underground burial option (section 4.3) is presented in general terms making the point that "...ensuring that there can be no unauthorised access to these materials, is vital throughout the whole fuel cycle." The paper maintains that security would be enhanced by the implementation of geological repositories, and suggests a global system of a fewer number of such facilities. There is, however, recognition of the larger transportation problems resulting from such a system.

Discussion Paper 6-2, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Centralized Storage Systems for Used Nuclear Fuel, by Mohan Rao and Dave Hardy of Hardy Stevenson and Associates Limited.

 In its examination of the centralized storage option, this paper lacks a specific section on the security issue. It does state that since centralized storage systems could have a long lifetime, they should "...include appropriate features that address security and safeguards issues such as proliferation and terrorism by limiting possibilities through which such acts could be carried out."

Two additional NWMO papers deal specifically with the security issue:

Discussion paper 1-4 Guiding Concepts: Nuclear Waste Management in Canada: The Security Dimension, by Franklyn Griffiths, Ignatieff Chair Emeritus of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto

This paper deals directly with the security aspects of nuclear waste management. It develops the idea of a dichotomy between centralized national security needs on the one hand, and the need to address individual human security needs on the other. So any national security perspective would need to be "enlarged" to involve the public as a whole in discussions. Griffiths maintains that the two perspectives are not entirely compatible when applied to options for nuclear waste management. He concludes that the NWMO has an opportunity to "make a human security effort to gain support for an agreed approach." Failing that, the Canadian public might embrace the idea of a continued on-site storage option and join in international efforts to explore other alternatives, (.e.g., one or more international repositories, transmutation of long-lived radionuclides). He also considers that an integrated approach between national and human security could be attempted.

 One other paper on security (unnumbered) was provided by the NWMO, titled Comments on "Nuclear Waste Management in Canada: The Security Dimension," by Prof. Franklyn Griffiths."

The author of these comments is Edwin S. Lyman, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, D.C. In his comments on Professor Griffith's paper, Edwin Lyman takes a more narrowly focussed approach to Nuclear Waste security than does Griffith. Lyman considers that the details of the "purely technical aspects" of this issue are more complex than Griffith suggests, and that an understanding of them is fundamental to any nuclear waste management program. Lyman outlines the key technical issues which must be faced and are not being addressed. He is highly critical of the U.S. government's apathetic response to public concerns over nuclear waste security subsequent to the September 2001 terrorist attacks. He is concerned that the nuclear industry may not be willing to underwrite the large costs of providing the required high level of security needed for public safety.

If that is the case in Canada, he suggests a Canadian public dialogue on questions surrounding the future of nuclear power plants and spent fuel production in the face of increasing terrorist threats. Nuclear Waste Saga home

READ:  The Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga:  http://www.web.net/~robbins

I feel spent.
I feel wrong.
I feel stupid.
I feel tired.
I feel sore.
I feel sick.
I feel weak.
I feel vulnerable.
I feel useless.
I feel helpless.

I feel like I could do better.
I feel like crap.
I feel like nothing's ever good enough.
I feel like I'm not worth it.

Worth what?
Anything worth something.