Safety @ MindSay



 

   
Excessive Much?

Driving in to work today I was on time for once. Huge shocker there, I know. At any rate, with many minutes to spare, I was in no hurry at all. So, as I turned the last corner onto the residential street that eventually turns into Hamline, I saw a school bus. It was slowing down with its yellow warning lights on.

 

I immediately slowed down and stopped. I have NO problem waiting for a school bus. Even when I am late this doesn't bother me. I rode the bus for years and have a great respect for the service they provide. So the red lights come on, the stop sign pops out and there I wait.

 

This little boy, about 8 or 9 by his size, gets off the bus in a backpack larger than himself. He jumps to the ground, hops up on the curb and crosses the sidewalk. Evidently, he gets dropped right in front of his house. He unlatches the gate of the fence, goes inside, turns around and relatches the gate before turning and heading up the walk to the front porch. He climbed the three steps to the front porch, walked up to the front door, opened the screen door, and used both hands to open the front door of the house. He then went inside and shut the door behind him.

 

Am I a stalker? No, of course not. Then, you have to wonder, how I know all of this...

 

Well, turns out, I was made to watch. The bus kept the stop sign out and the red lights on until the boy was INSIDE THE HOUSE! I mean, come on. I love children as much as the next guy and want for them to be kept safe and sound, but this seemed a little excessive. Once the kid is on the sidewalk and out of the street seems safe enough, but surely once he is inside the fenced in yard is enough for even the most hardlined parent?????

 

I kid you not, I was made to wait several minutes until this kid (who was in no particular hurry, btw) was inside of his home before I could continue down his street. Even if I wanted to run this kid over he was pretty much out of my reach once he crossed the fenceline, so what the hell were we waiting for?

 

Thank goodness I had those few minutes to spare. As it was, after parking and heading across campus I walked in the door as the bell tolled four times. Right on time.

 

Nothing excessive about me.

 
 
   
 

The Little Reactor That Couldn’t
Back in the late 1950's, ideas for the use of small nuclear reactors for various purposes were in vogue. During that period, when I worked for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, I heard speculation over the possible use of atomic energy to run our autos, heat our houses, lift our rockets to the heavens. Many of these ideas were so wild, they were quickly dropped. However, some small reactors were designed and used for university research projects, medical and industrial isotope production and even nuclear submarine propulsion.  

Small nuclear reactors can range in power output from less that one up to several hundred megawatts.

More recently, prospects for a so-called nuclear renaissance have revitalized speculation about the design and use of small reactors in Canada.  For example, in an interview with CBC News, in February, 2009, Premier Brad Wall said  “... he hoped Saskatchewan could play a role developing small reactor technology. He went on to say the provincial government might be able to devote some resources to research and development in that area.”            
A report by Saskatchewan’s Uranium  Development Partnership, (UDP) included an upbeat statement that  “because they require little or no refueling and produce both heat and electricity, small reactors could eventually compete with small-scale diesel, oil and gas generation as a power alternative in remote sites.”  The report went on to state that, “Saskatchewan has the opportunity to participate in this market by partnering with a commercial technology developer on a demonstration project.”

Ah, but–the history of small reactors in Canada includes some very expensive “lemons,” something that should give pause to anyone seriously contemplating getting into that kind of business.

As an example, one of those not so successful small reactor efforts was the SLOWPOKE 3, a brainchild of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL).

The Slowpoke became an issue for me in 1986, when I was a spokesperson for the Concerned Citizens’ of Manitoba  (CCM.), Canada, a nuclear waste watchdog group.  After years of our lobbying, the Manitoba provincial government was poised to pass a bill which would prohibit the burial or long-term storage of high level nuclear waste in the Province.

AECL officials were quite upset over the upcoming legislation, one of their concerns being that the bill contained a clause which prohibited the storage of high-level nuclear waste originating from outside the Province for more than seven days. This, according to the AECL testimony, would result in its inability to store the waste from its new "Safe Low Power Kritical (sic) Experiment," (a.k.a. SLOWPOKE) at its Whiteshell, Manitoba based nuclear research station.

The SLOWPOKE 3 was to be a small (10 Megawatt) heat and isotope producing nuclear reactor that AECL was actively marketing around the world, even though it was still in the early stages of untested design. AECL maintained that the pending legislation would force it to set up waste storage facilities elsewhere at additional cost, and that Manitoba would lose "commercial benefits" from the SLOWPOKE 3 program.

It appeared that AECL planned to retrieve the waste from all the SLOWPOKE 3 reactors that it expected to sell in Canada, and abroad, and bring it to Manitoba for storage!  Nevertheless, the Manitoba legislation was enacted into law.

However, that did not stop AECL from promoting its mini-nuke.

I recalled reading an article in the Lac du Bonnet, Manitoba, Leader of June 15, 1982, headlined "Nuclear Furnaces Could Soon Be Heating Your House." It went on to describe the small, unattended, SLOWPOKE reactor which could heat a building and require refueling only once every five years.

"Safe Low Power Kritical Experiment!"  It was fascinating that AECL chose to use the word "Safe," to describe its new "baby" reactor. It left me with more apprehensions than I already had about its large power reactors, with the acronym, "CANDU," which lacked that vital word “Safe.” Would they now change CANDU to "SCANDU"?

Also, I wondered why the use of the word "experiment." After all, who wants to buy a radioactive "experiment" to heat their community centre or other buildings?

A demonstration 2-megawatt version of the SLOWPOKE 3 reactor began very low-power operation at AECL's Pinawa, Manitoba, Whiteshell research station on July 15, 1987. But well before that small demonstration model was up and running, the Crown Corporation was already actively marketing the non-existent 10 mw version in such places as China, Korea, Europe and Canada's own Northwest Territory.

By January, 1988, AECL had signed a memorandum of agreement with Hungary for a potential SLOWPOKE 3 sale.

A May 29, 1986, Winnipeg Free Press article headlined "Radioactive Waste Repository for Manitoba Planned by Agency," really caught our attention. AECL’s idea was to remove spent fuel from each SLOWPOKE 3 reactor every five to eight years. The thirty or forty fuel bundles would be placed in concrete cylinders at its research facilities at Pinawa, Manitoba and Chalk River, Ontario. Eventually, it was reported, the waste would go into the (still non-existent) permanent underground waste repository.  CCM took the position that the Province should not permit storage of SLOWPOKE 3 waste and that (it should) ". . . block the buildup of anything which tends to take us closer to a nuclear waste repository in Manitoba."

CCM considered that if AECL started bringing its foreign customers' SLOWPOKE 3 excrement back to Canada, it would be well on the road to the full-scale commercial international radioactive waste dump about which CCM had been warning the public for so many years.

According to the article, Provincial Environment Minister Gerard Lecuyer was surprised by this development and indicated that ". . his initial reaction was one of opposition."

CCM's interest in the SLOWPOKE 3 grew further as a result of another article in the Winnipeg Free Press on July 24, 1987, which reported AECL's Metro Dmytriw as saying that the Corporation had received an initial inquiry about the purchase of one from an interested party in Manitoba.

According to that article, Dmytriw also suggested that a SLOWPOKE 3 nuclear reactor might be a replacement for Winnipeg's aging central steam heating plant. The article pointed out that AECL had held no discussions with the city nor did city officials express any interest in the idea at the time.

Other groups had also been criticizing the SLOWPOKE 3. The Montreal Gazette, May 22, 1986, reported Norm Rubin of Energy Probe in Toronto as saying . . .(the idea is) "crazy." Rubin wondered how, in the event of an accident, a hospital or shopping mall could be evacuated, especially since the SLOWPOKE 3 would operate "unattended" for some periods of time.

The same Gazette article included similar concerns expressed by Gordon Edwards, President of the Montreal-based Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility. Both Rubin and Edwards pointed to the unsolved nuclear waste problem as a good reason for not proceeding with the development and marketing of the SLOWPOKE 3 nuclear reactor.

Aside from the waste, safety, and economic questions surrounding the SLOWPOKE 3, CCM expressed concern over reactor security. An unattended reactor operating in a small community or a building in a large city could present unparalleled opportunities for anyone who might want to steal high-level nuclear waste. (The design called for spent fuel rods to be stored within each reactor, until removed to some other location.)  

Other possible acts might include sabotaging the untended reactors themselves, or pumping out the water (which becomes more radioactive as the reactor operates), into a municipal system. Unforeseen and unanticipated damage and acts of terrorism are a real possibility when one considers the many unstable political situations around the world.

Even large power reactors have their security problems. According to the October 2, 1987 Critical Mass Energy Project's newsletter, Public Citizen, in the US, "Dozens of security breaches occurred at nuclear plant sites in 1986. These include vandalism and sabotage directed at reactor operations; use of firearms on plant sites by unauthorized persons; and increasing drug use among nuclear workers." Also, some workers have been found, literally, asleep at the switch.

My personal involvement with the SLOWPOKE, became even more intense when my wife, Phyl, and I moved from Manitoba to Québec, in 1988.

We had just arrived at the  home of friends in the town of Beebe, in the Eastern Townships of Québec. It was March 15, 1988, and we were on a house hunting expedition.

Somewhat tired from the day's journey, which included a six-hour long delayed flight from Winnipeg, and a long drive in a rented car through a heavy snow storm from Montréal, we looked forward to some relaxation and good conversation that evening.

Our friends, however, stood by quietly watching, as we stared incredulously at the March 14 edition of the Sherbrooke, Québec, Record, which was propped up on their dining table.

Plastered across the front page was a story about AECL's plan to construct and operate a ten megawatt SLOWPOKE ("Safe Low Energy Critical Experiment") nuclear reactor at the  Centre hospitalier universitaire de Sherbrooke (CHUS), the large University Medical Centre located in Québec’s Eastern Townships.

I quickly scanned the story, which someone had leaked to the newspaper, revealing AECL's plan to build the reactor for the stated purpose of heating the hospital.

AECL was to own and operate it, and the hospital would pay the heating bill. Most importantly, the reactor, the first of its kind, was planned to serve as a demonstration based on the two megawatt version (which we knew was still nowhere near full power)at the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment at Pinawa, Manitoba.

"I don't believe this," and "You've got to be kidding," were but a few (printable!) comments made by the two of us, as we read the lead article.

Our activities in Manitoba were well known to some of the environmental and peace activists in the Townships area. We had made contact with them during the 1985 controversy over a possible U.S. nuclear waste dump in northern Vermont, very close to the Canadian border.

When some of them heard that we were moving into the area, we were asked to join them in dealing with the new-to-Sherbrooke SLOWPOKE 3 issue.

Thus, a short time after our arrival into what we had hoped would surely be a relaxed new start in retirement life, Phyl and I were involved in strategy meetings with peace and ecology groups, a meeting with AECL and hospital officials, news conferences and media interviews.

It was as if we had never left Winnipeg.

Since my concern about the so-called SLOWPOKE 3 reactor had already started to grow over the past several years in Winnipeg, it seemed somehow appropriate to be involved in this new controversy.

The more I learned about the new mini-nuke, the less I liked it: It would use highly-enriched uranium which must be imported from other countries. It would create high-level radioactive waste, which would contain weapons usable plutonium. It would be marketed anywhere in the world. It would operate unattended for periods of time, leaving it vulnerable to those with malicious intent. Also, it would routinely emit radioactive gasses into the environment.

Yet, the plan now was to place such a machine in, of all places, a large teaching hospital, where, as is true of anything else designed by humans, accidents could, and did happen.

When Phyl and I finally moved from Winnipeg, we had put our belongings in storage as we continued to search for a house in the Eastern Townships. As it turned out, we did not find a house we liked before we sold our place in Winnipeg. So, we rented a furnished mobile home in a farming area near the town of Beebe.

We brought the essentials for living with us in our camper van which pulled our old 1960s'tent trailer from Winnipeg to the Townships.

However, I had packed one box of assorted files on nuclear waste issues in the tent trailer. Now, I am not especially a mystic, but it turned out that one of those files was full of papers on the SLOWPOKE reactor! It contained information which later proved to be very useful in shaping future events.

However, it now seemed as if our dream of "peace, quiet and contemplation" in the rolling hills of the Eastern Townships was not to be. [Our histories showed that we were probably never cut out for that kind of a life anyway!] For us, it would be the "Year of the SLOWPOKE."

The minutes of a February 16, 1988 meeting between AECL and the CHUS Hospital Board of Directors include an AECL quote that ". . . an appropriate strategy produces very little public reaction."

This time, however, AECL's "appropriate strategy" obviously did not take into account that someone(s) high up within the hospital's staff itself might have more than a few misgivings about the venture and would leak the information to the media.

The Townships Peace Group asked us to attend a May 2, 1988 meeting at the CHUS with hospital officials, AECL representatives, and persons concerned about the SLOWPOKE project.

We were already seated at the board room conference table when the AECL contingent arrived. Several AECL officials present from the Pinawa, Manitoba, Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment (WNRE), were visibly shaken when they saw us there. Of course, they did not know that we had very recently moved from Winnipeg to Québec. "What are you doing here?" asked one of them. "We live here." I retorted. I'll never forget the
astonished look on their faces.

The Robbins, former Concerned Citizens of Manitoba stalwarts, were probably the last two people they wanted to see that morning!

They were no doubt unhappy about the presence of others who also were at the meeting, including Gordon Edwards, well known nuclear critic from Montréal, and Max Krell, a local university professor, (and a very concerned nuclear physicist).

The hospital officials and AECL reminded me of a group of kids who had just got caught with their hands in the cookie jar. I imagine that they all realized at that moment, that their "appropriate strategy" might have just gone down the tube!

Although good manners were observed throughout, it became quite obvious that the citizens' representatives were not going to buy in on the proposal.

It did not take long for a coalition of peace and environmental groups and other concerned individuals to take shape in the Eastern Townships. The group used the same initials used by the hospital, i.e., the "Coalition CHUS" (Continue Hydro, not Uranium for our Safety, or, in French, Continuer l'Hydro non l'Uranium pour notre Sécurité.)

After the initial flurry of organizational and media activity, Phyl and I settled into a relatively benign role of "behind the scenes" support to the mostly French speaking coalition. But I had one more moment in the spotlight, which Phyl provided for me.

She had carefully reviewed the contents of the SLOWPOKE file that we had brought with us from Winnipeg, and had found an amazingly frank, and startling statement by John Hillborn, the inventor of the SLOWPOKE reactor, concerning the possibility of nuclear accidents.

In a June, 1981 paper he co-authored for the Second Annual Meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Society in Ottawa,(AECL document No. 7438), Hillborn said that, "It is now well known that people will accept frequent, small disasters more readily than rare catastrophes."

Airplane crashes were used as an example. The paper continued,
"Although we may have to endure the legacy of Three Mile Island for many years, a decentralized system of small reactors which effectively eliminates the possibility of a single big accident may have a significant advantage in licensing, insuring, and gaining public acceptance. Eventually the public may accept accidents to small reactors to the same extent that they accept fires, explosions, and airplane crashes, as long as the consequences are not obviously worse. It would be unrealistic however, to expect many communities to welcome nuclear reactors within their boundaries until there are severe regional shortages of gas and electricity."

On June 22, 1988, I read this statement, without comment, at the Coalition's first press conference. The media jumped on it. The following day the quote was used in the lead editorial in the Sherbrooke Record . Hilborn's statement became one of the Coalition's, and the media's favorite items. It was an excellent example of the fact that one of our most powerful weapons against AECL was its own prose.

I was not alone in finding Hilborn's statement to be a chilling one, with its assessment of public reaction to "small" nuclear catastrophes. The 1980s witnessed bitter and protracted conflict and public concern over radioactive spills from discarded medical equipment in scrap yards, radioactive soil in housing developments, radioactive materials dropping from space
satellites, and missing quantities of plutonium.

The fact that there is no safe level of radiation was understood by the public. Increasingly, evidence points to negative health effects from the most negligible levels of radiation. And the public has become aware of the consequences from nuclear radiation in whatever forms and amounts. Even the negative side of natural radiation has become more evident. There is nothing to suggest that the public will, in Hilborn's terms, easily accept "small" nuclear disasters.

Coalition CHUS continued to raise questions about the safety of the reactor. An exchange of correspondence between an official of Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and myself, revealed that the so-called "nuclear regulators" had no(!) safety information on the reactor. Their October 5, 1988 letter to me stated that "It is likely that the 10-mw reactor will be significantly different from the (2-mw) SDR." The letter also noted that "At this time the AECB does not have any detailed design information on the proposed 10-mw installation."
Not only was the 10-megawatt SLOWPOKE 3 an "experiment" in the true sense of the word, even its supposed prototype 2-mw version, at the WNRE, was still in its embryonic stages. AECB had reviewed that reactor and requested that AECL take a number of significant steps to improve its safety.

As the SLOWPOKE issue developed and the Coalition CHUS quickly grew during the Summer and Autumn of 1988, Phyl and I continued to provide it with advice, moral support, and assistance in developing letters and fact sheets

I was absolutely astounded at the energy and the effectiveness of the anti-SLOWPOKE coalition. Something was happening all the time. Meetings, mailings, radio and TV coverage, debates, button and t-shirts sales --- just about every legitimate, democratic, non-violent form of protest and expression was taking place.

By October, 1988, the movement had acquired a life of its own. There were so many media events, activities, and speakers' appearances going on that it was difficult just to keep track of them all.

As Coalition CHUS rapidly expanded, Phyl and I continued work in our behind the scenes role to supply information and ideas. For example, in one of her fact sheets Phyl included information about AECL's own stated policy of excluding pregnant women and small children from tours and open houses at the WNRE, which contained the 2 megawatt "prototype" of the SLOWPOKE.

Pregnant women and small children visit the CHUS medical centre every day for medical treatment. Would not a ten megawatt reactor at the hospital provide at least equal, if not greater risk? The point was not lost on the nurses at the hospital. Their union passed a unanimous resolution opposing the reactor, declaring it a public health risk.

By November, 1988, coalition support was estimated at twenty-five thousand, with almost ten organizations a week joining our forces. Much of the opposition came from the hospital staff itself. Politicians were falling over themselves to come onside.

The handwriting on the wall was writ large and clear. On December 20, 1988, we received the best Christmas present of all: the hospital Board of Directors announced its withdrawal from the SLOWPOKE project, a decision taken in spite of AECL's initial offer to absorb the five-to-seven million-dollar capital cost. Coalition CHUS had done its work well.

AECL folded its tents and left Sherbrooke. It had lost another round in its struggle to market its mini-nuke.

AECL's public relations and sales forces had again failed to convince any community that they had invented the perfect nuclear heating machine; one which they promoted as being inherently safe, and which would operate in the midst of a populated area without negative consequences, for at long as 30 years -- - even though the design of the reactor had not yet been finalized or approved!

Undaunted, the federal Crown Corporation continued to seek a location for a full-scale demonstration SLOWPOKE 3 to enhance the reactor's credibility in the eyes of potential foreign customers. But no one was buying. After two more failed attempts (one at a G.E. plant in Peterborough, Ontario, and another lengthy one at the University of Saskatchewan), the marketing project stalled.

A few years later, the two megawatt "prototype" at WNRE (which had never operated at full strength) was shut down. By November 1991, and forty-five million dollars later, the entire SLOWPOKE 3 project was consigned to oblivion.

In a 2007 article on “ Nuclear Smoke and Mirrors,” Jim Harding, a retired University of Regina, professor of environmental and justice studies commented on some of the Canadian reactor designs.

He wrote that “... the list of botched AECL designs is lengthy. There was the Organic Cooled Reactor in Manitoba, which was an expensive dead end. There was the Candu Boiling Light Water Reactor in Québec, which (without even including design costs) was a $126 million disaster. Then there was the Slowpoke Energy System, for which design work cost $45 million, which didn’t work properly. Next came the Candu-3, for which design work cost $75 million, which no one wanted. And the Candu-9, with design costs still secret, which was a no-go in South Korea. More recently AECL built the Maple Reactor at Chalk River, which threatens to become another technological and financial fiasco since the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is refusing to even license it for operation”.    

The moral of this story is that there is no such thing as an inherently safe nuclear reactor.  Those who contemplate going down that road should carefully assess the lessons from the past.  If they do so, they might very well choose other, more preferable alternatives.
                                    
Walt Robbins

The Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
 










































 
 
 
 

   
Joy after Tragedy
On September 25, 2009, Conversations with American Heroes at the Watering Hole will feature a conversation with Sharon Knutson-Felix has served as Executive Director of the 100 Club of Arizona.

Program Date: September 25, 2009
Program Time: 2100 hours, Pacific
Topic: Joy after Tragedy
Listen Live:
http://www.blogtalkradio.com/LawEnforcement/2009/09/26/Joy-after-Tragedy

About the Guest
Sharon Knutson-Felix has served as Executive Director of the 100 Club of Arizona since 2001 but her first experience with the 100 Club came several years before, in 1998, when Sharon’s husband, DPS Officer Doug Knutson, was tragically killed in the line of duty. She received a check from an amazing organization that’s mission was to support the families of public safety in times of tragedy, which she found out was the 100 Club of Arizona. Having been a recipient, Sharon truly understands what the 100 Club’s benefits, both financial and emotional, mean to a public safety family in a time of crisis. She has become a passionate advocate of the 100 Club since becoming its Executive Director and has been instrumental in its recent growth.

Sharon’s experience in dealing with public safety and her commitment to supporting its men and women position her as the ideal leader for this public safety non-profit. Since being elected as the Executive Director, Sharon has led the organization to create and launch six new benefits and programs, including the non-line of duty death benefit and the safety enhancement stipend program which provides equipment to public safety agencies in an effort to prevent or minimize tragedy. Yearly benefits given out have increased from $100,000 in 2001 to over $800,000 in 2008. Membership has more than doubled and corporate sponsorships have increased phenomenally, including securing the largest corporate sponsorships in the history of the 100 Club.

Before coming to the 100 Club of Arizona , Sharon served two years as President of Arizona Concerns of Police Survivors (COPS) which provides resources to help families of law enforcement officers who have been killed in the line of duty rebuild their lives. She has also served, and continues to serve, in many community support groups. For the past nine years, Sharon has been a part of the Arizona Critical Incident Stress Management Team (CISM), a group that provides emotional support for public safety officers (and their families) who have been injured in the line of duty so that they may continue to serve their community in a law enforcement capacity. She has also been a part of her church support group, Soulcare Ministry, for the past four years that provides a system of peer support for people in the community dealing with difficult issues and tough life decisions.

Knutson-Felix is also the author of the successful book, Gifts My Father Gave Me: Finding Joy after Tragedy that is part memoir and part grief advisor. Sharon is also a sought after speaker and grief counselor. She is the wife of DPS Executive Officer David Felix, the loving mother of two children, and grandmother of five grandkids.

About the Watering Hole
The Watering Hole is Police slang for a location cops go off-duty to blow off steam and talk about work and life. Sometimes funny; sometimes serious; but, always interesting.

About the Host
Lieutenant Raymond E. Foster was a sworn member of the Los Angeles Police Department for 24 years. He retired in 2003 at the rank of Lieutenant. He holds a bachelor’s from the Union Institute and University in Criminal Justice Management and a Master’s Degree in Public Financial Management from California State University, Fullerton; and, has completed his doctoral course work. Raymond E. Foster has been a part-time lecturer at California State University, Fullerton and Fresno; and is currently a Criminal Justice Department chair, faculty advisor and lecturer with the Union Institute and University. He has experience teaching upper division courses in Law Enforcement, public policy, Public Safety Technology and leadership. Raymond is an experienced author who has published numerous articles in a wide range of venues including magazines such as Government Technology, Mobile Government, Airborne Law Enforcement Magazine, and Police One. He has appeared on the History Channel and radio programs in the United States and Europe as subject matter expert in technological applications in Law Enforcement.

Listen, call, join us at the Watering Hole:
http://www.blogtalkradio.com/LawEnforcement/2009/09/26/Joy-after-Tragedy

Program Contact Information
Lieutenant Raymond E. Foster, LAPD (ret.), MPA
editor@police-writers.com
909.599.7530
 
 
   
 

RAD: Rape Aggression Defense
On July 10, 2009, Conversations with American Heroes at the Watering Hole will feature a discussion former parole officer and RAD Instructor Kimberly Cheryl Elliot.

Program Date: July 10, 2009
Program Time: 2100 hours, Pacific
Topic: RAD: Rape Aggression Defense
Listen Live:
http://www.blogtalkradio.com/LawEnforcement/2009/07/11/RAD-Rape-Aggression-Defense

About the Guest
Kimberly Cheryl Elliott spent 17 years and parole and probation officer for Missouri State Division of Probation and Parole. She “is a seasoned marketing professional with 18 years experience in pharmaceutical sales and management. As a victim of crime, she is very passionate about her career as founder and managing partner of Executive Defense Technology, LLC, an anti-victimization education firm. As a speaker, author, consultant and Nationally Certified RAD (Rape/Aggression/Defense) Instructor, she helps clients optimize their personal safety. As a seminar leader, she provides a comprehensive course that begins with awareness, prevention, risk reduction and avoidance, while progressing on to the basics of hands on defense training. Her clients include everyone from elderly church group members and housewives to employees of law firms, TV / Radio Stations and other Fortune 500 Corporations.”

Kimberly Cheryl Elliott is the author of Escape From The Pharma Cartel: My Life as a Member of the Pharmaceutical Drug Cartel; Take This Pill and... Sell It!: A Guide To Getting A Job In The Pharmaceutical Industry; Shattered Reality; and, Are Your Habits Killing You? A Complete Personal Handbook Of Safety Suggestions to Incorporate into Your Everyday Life: Because the Best Defense Is a Good Offensive Plan!

About the Watering Hole
The Watering Hole is police slang for a location cops go off-duty to blow off steam and talk about work and life. Sometimes funny; sometimes serious; but, always interesting.

About the Host
Lieutenant Raymond E. Foster was a sworn member of the Los Angeles Police Department for 24 years. He retired in 2003 at the rank of Lieutenant. He holds a bachelor’s from the Union Institute and University in Criminal Justice Management and a Master’s Degree in Public Financial Management from California State University, Fullerton; and, has completed his doctoral course work. Raymond E. Foster has been a part-time lecturer at California State University, Fullerton and Fresno; and is currently a Criminal Justice Department chair, faculty advisor and lecturer with the Union Institute and University. He has experience teaching upper division courses in Law Enforcement, public policy, Government Technology and leadership. Raymond is an experienced author who has published numerous articles in a wide range of venues including magazines such as Government Technology, Mobile Government, Airborne Law Enforcement Magazine, and Police One. He has appeared on the History Channel and radio programs in the United States and Europe as subject matter expert in technological applications in Law Enforcement.

Listen, call, join us at the Watering Hole:
http://www.blogtalkradio.com/LawEnforcement/2009/07/11/RAD-Rape-Aggression-Defense

Program Contact Information
Lieutenant Raymond E. Foster, LAPD (ret.), MPA
editor@police-writers.com
909.599.7530
 
 
 

   
Free Health and safety document to adapt for a small office
Health & Safety Policy HEALTH & SAFETY POLICY FOR EMPLOYEES You are welcome to adapt and use this document suitable for a small office with computers and paper and staff and visitors. Not a paper mill or a coal mine. Ours is written for a IT Training company running MS office applications for 20-30 visitors per day and passed muster for a basic audit by Investors in People. Good luck! First Aiders at The Mouse Training Company Office – John Caulfield & Charis Alexander General Statement · Our policy is to work in the safest practicable manner. The Company recognises that the health and safety and general well being of all employees and other persons on the Company’s premises, or those carrying out Company business off-site are the responsibility of the Company. · It is the duty of Management to do everything reasonable and practicable to prevent injury or ill health and it is equally the duty of every member of staff to exercise personal responsibility for his/her own safety and that of others. This is required by law. · Our policy is to adhere to all current and future legal requirements on health and safety, which affect the Company’s operations. The attention of everyone joining the Company is directed to this policy. · The Directors have overall responsibility for the implementation of the Company Safety Policy and all reports and recommendations from the Safety Representative will go to them Health & Safety Procedure The Mouse Training Company Ltd. Health and Safety Policy Statement Health and safety at work etc Act 1974 This is the Health and Safety Policy Statement of The Mouse Training Company Ltd Our Statement of General Policy is: to provide adequate control of the health and safety risks arising from our work activities; to consult with our employees on matters affecting their health and safety; to provide and maintain safe plant and equipment; to ensure safe handling and use of substances; to provide information, instruction and supervision for employees; to ensure all employees are competent to do their tasks, and to give them adequate training; to prevent accidents and cases of work-related ill health; to maintain safe and healthy working conditions; and to review and revise this policy as necessary at regular intervals. Signed (Employer): ………………………………………….. Date: Review date: 1/09/08 _____________________________________________________________________ Responsibilities Overall and final responsibility of health and safety is that of John Caulfield Day-to-day responsibility for ensuring this policy is put into practice is delegated to the test centre manager To ensure health and safety standards are maintained/improved, the following people have responsibility in the following areas Name Responsibility John Caulfield Training Centre All employees have to: Co-operate with supervisors and managers on health and safety matters; Not interfere with anything provided to safeguard their health and safety; Take reasonable care of their own health and safety; and Report all health and safety concerns to an appropriate person (as detailed in the policy statement) Health and safety risks arising from our work activities Risk assessments will be undertaken by the test centre manager Action required to remove/control risks will be approved by John Caulfield. Test centre manager will be responsible for ensuring the action required is implemented Assessments will be reviewed every year or when the work activity changes, whichever is soonest. Consultation with employees Employee Representatives are: Charis Alexander Eddie Holder Consultation with employees is provided by Staff meetings held at 6 week intervals. Safe Plant and Equipment Eddie Holder will be responsible for identifying all equipment/plant needing maintenance. Eddie Holder will be responsible for ensuring effective maintenance procedures are drawn up. Charis Alexander will be responsible for ensuring that all identified maintenance is implemented. Any problems found with plant/equipment should be reported to Charis Alexander Eddie Holder will check that new plant and equipment meets health and safety standards before it is purchased. Information, instruction and supervision The Health and Safety Law poster is displayed in The Sales Office. Health and Safety advice is available from the administrative assistant or www.hse.gov.uk Supervision of young workers/trainees will be arranged/undertaken/monitored by the Relevant Mentor The test centre manager is responsible for ensuring that our employees working at locations under the control of other employers are given relevant health and safety information. Competency for Tasks and Training Induction training will be provided for all employees by Job specific training will be provided by the Department manager Training records are kept in the Personnel Files Training will be identified, arranged and monitored by the Department manager Accidents, first aid and work-related ill health The first aid box is kept in the Rest Area The appointed person(s)/first aider(s) is/are John Caulfield & Charis Alexander All accidents and cases of work-related ill health are to be recorded in the accident book. The book is kept in John & Charis’s office The administrative assistant is responsible for reporting accidents, diseases and dangerous occurrences to the enforcing authority. Monitoring To check our working conditions, and ensure our safe working practices are being followed, we will Carry out a monthly walk around assessment. Investigate any accidents that occur and take the remedial action. Charis Alexander is responsible for investigating accidents John Caulfield is responsible for investigating work-related causes of sickness absences. John Caulfield is responsible for acting on investigation findings to prevent a reoccurrence. Emergency Procedures – Fire and Evacuation · Charis Alexander is responsible for ensuring the fire risk assessment is undertaken and implemented · Escape routes are checked by Charis Alexander · Fire extinguishers are maintained and checked by John Caulfield · Alarms are tested by the Building Manager every week · Emergency evacuation will be tested every Quarter Health & Safety Reportable Incident Report Form Date: Name of Person(s) Involved: Incident: Treatment: Follow Up Treatment Required: Action taken to prevent further incidents of this nature: Date of implementation of Remedial Action:
 
 
   
 

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Re: Slim to none. - lol, flare jeans are ugly. burn them. your school is gay. o.O mine is kick ass.

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