Al-Qaeda: Ideological movement or ideology?

There are a wide variety of excellent and not so excellent books on terrorism out there. I put myself to sleep last night with one of the best, Jason Burke's superb Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. He writes for the London Observer, and is probably one of the few journalists who can authoritatively write on terrorism.If you are interested in terrorism at any level, whether from the ideological and psychological aspects of its various themes, or simply as a policy problem, this is probably the best book to start with. His deconstruction of the al-Qaeda network, and its relationship to the myriad movements of militant islamofascism, is crucial to understanding the evolution of the network, and the unique potitical context in which it exists. For instance, he clarifies to a great extent the confusion in Western media and governments about Zarqawi, the jihadist in Iraq, and his relationship to Osama bin Laden. We are now seeing signs that "al-Qaeda" is evolving from a dedicated organization that performs operations into more of an idea. This "idea" can be assumed by anyone who believes in it and is willing to perform violent acts to prove his belief, which we've seen in the decentralization of terror attacks and organizations (the Morroccan networks, the Tunisian bombing, the Madrid bombings, Bali, the Istanbul bombings, etc.). This decentralization relies on local and regional initiative, which often makes it harder to detect (especially in the "lone wolf" scenario). Al-Qaeda, "the base," becomes the ideological foundation to which future action appeals for legitimacy.This decentralization of operations makes the launch of a spectacular attack on the scale of 9/11 more difficult, but it also makes the network harder to isolate and destroy. One segment of it can always survive while others are isolated and destroyed, until the survivor thrives to the point where it is able to replicate itself (this is the elegance of these kinds of systems; something akin to biological, cellular-level reproduction).Al-Qaeda's peculiar brand of lunacy spent many years on the fringe of Islam and Islamic politics. After 9/11, it was brought front and center, and its appeal to a generation of young men is undeniable. The way I put it, in a reply to Athena, is this:

The age of these young men is interesting. It hints at that late-adolescent narcissism that makes violent jihad appeal to both the young man's need for an affirmation (of potency) while having this symbolic, transcendent altruism-through-expressive act at the same time; self-destructiveness as the height of self-obsession. Truly a pathetic twist of hatred and self-loathing, yet extremely dangerous.I think this kind of aesthetic nihilism--this false "selflessness"-- is at the heart of al-Qaeda's own ideology, which rests on expressive acts, as well as being the key manipulative lever Hamas exploits in recruiting suicide bombers. The particular Islamic doctrines into which this is coded and distributed serve to give this paradoxical altruistic-narcissism a certain coherency.Young men across all cultures have the tendency to latch onto a given popular, yet ultimately artificial conception of masculinity, in seeking an idea of what it means to be an authentic male.

Osama bin Laden's islamofascism is at the point of assuming the status of the paradigm of masculinity to which young men look to measure themselves and create a comprehensible identity. This phonemonon occurs throughout cultures, but is merely represented differently -- i.e., it is coded differently. Certain aspects of this code--at the level of political agenda--cohere with traditional Leftist concepts, which often complicates their ability to either understand al-Qaeda or give it a moral critique. Resemblances between their model worldview (e.g. economic determinism, political-economic domination, a rejection of the dominant paradigm, militant resistance, liberation rhetoric), allow them to comprehend Islamofascist terrorism as being internal to their ideological framework. Al-Qaeda even views its missions as that of a kind of vanguard, a concept of immediate appeal to the Leftist. However, the hard Left's blindness to the qualitative ideological difference--a difference at the heart of political motivation--between the standard leftist critique and al-Qaeda's project leaves them incapable of approaching Islamofascism as its own distinct model, with equally distinct issues of political ethics involved. But this is a digression, and deserves its own post. Young men wanting to make sense to themselves and to the world are looking for an intelligible model by which to do so, which they then emulate. The affirmation of their assumed masculinity comes through acts-as-expression. Ultimately, the only way to deal with this is to fashion a way of making the code nonsensical; so that it doesn't cohere as a masculine ideal. Doing so requires that it be made irrelevant and unintelligible. How possible this is, what with the demographics and socio-economic geography that we're contending with, is open to doubt.[later edited for clarity and other things]